Incentives to invest in the zone are no different from those offered to any foreign company looking to invest in Ethiopia, including tax holidays and waivers on import tariffs for raw materials.
This includes seven years of income tax holiday for Qiyuan, seven years income tax holiday for enterprises in the zone who produce products mainly for the export market and four years income tax holiday for enterprises that produce for the local market.
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The Qiyuan Group has pressed the Ethiopian government to try and arrive at further incentives and concessions. Indeed, one of the authors was at the Ethiopian embassy in Beijing whilst a delegation from Qiyuan was meeting with the ambassador to discuss issues and to 'exchange information' relating to zone policies and the current incentives on offer. 30 According to the Qiyuan management in Dukem and officials at the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade, a key issue is the ten year 30% value-added tax (VAT) which Qiyuan is obliged to pay. The Ethiopian government's position is that a decrease does not comply with the principles of competiveness.
Qiyuan have also proposed better incentives and preferential policies to compensate for having to 27 However, structural weaknesses in Ethiopia's infrastructure (now being addressed by the state's huge investments) limit the value of such largesse. Electricity and water shortages are endemic to Ethiopia. 32 This has at times impeded the smooth development of the zone and has even led to a wholesale cessation of construction efforts. 33 Moreover, misunderstandings exist over whether the pledged 30% from Addis to support the cost of internal infrastructure being built will actually be paid. According to reports, officials in Addis agreed to pay when zone construction is complete. However, some members of the management at the Qiyuan Group expressed concern that this would not be honoured and wanted the costs recovered sooner. 34 In response, one official at the Ministry of Industry asserted that delivery of the 30% is guaranteed and that the Chinese developers should not worry, but instead focus on finishing the construction of the zone and begin operations.
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In an interview with Wu Shuaiju of the management of the zone, problems were enunciated.
Wu complained that investors cannot obtain title deeds issued by the Government and thus think that their property rights are unprotected. This issue about land title deeds has had a knock-on effect on investment license applications, duty-free applications, construction permit applications and capital loan applications. Qiyuan currently charges enterprises 1.00 ETB (5 cents) per m², the same that Qiyuan paid to Oromia State. Additionally, a one-off land development fee is charged at about 135 ETB ($6.7) per m². The main bone of contention for Qiyuan was that its investment on the zone was considerable and that the current estimate is that it will take more than twenty one years to get the investment returned. The Chinese government (mainly through the embassy in Addis) provide guidance and support, but they do not get involved in the business side of the project-this is left to the investor.
The Qiyuan Group's relationship to the Chinese embassy in Addis mainly consists of the latter helping establish and co-ordinate relations with Chinese companies and parties interested in investing in Ethiopia. 44 But beyond this, the involvement of the embassy is minimal. This fits with previous studies which have found that:
[T]he Chinese government has taken a 'hands off' attitude towards African policies on these zones. We could find no evidence or even rumours of conditionalities or quid-pro- 
Catalytic potential?
A key component of the SEZ paradigm is to move away from the protected and isolated importsubstitution approach of the past towards one ostensibly guided by international competitiveness, regional co-operation and a more diversified, private-driven ownership pattern. 49 In this sense, the SEZs purport to be targeted attempts to stimulate economic growth by creating globally competitive spatial entities through new investments, infrastructural development and jobs creation. 50 Through these initiatives, the host state seeks to "crowd in" private investment in order to unlock inherent economic potential in a specific spatial location with unrealised economic potential. 51 The basic task is to use existing frameworks and/or construct new ones as a means to formulate a certain geographic space by which the existing economies can be developed and diversified. 52 In the study of SEZs this has been termed the 'catalytic effect' where there is potential for SEZs to engender dynamism in the economy beyond the spatial restrictions of the zone and stimulate development. 53 Cheesman defines the catalytic effect as 'interaction with the domestic economy: specifically they deal with industrial spillovers and the establishment of zonedomestic linkages'. The EIZ is, at present, noticeable for it's rather scattergun approach with regard to the types of industries located in the zone. The diversity of industries is problematic given that influential development theory argues that a more directed and steered industrial policy is needed in late developers, even if this is at the expense of a broad-based strategy. This critique of the EIZ, based on the work of Alexander Gershenkron and Albert Hirschman, raises important questions about the efficacy of the EIZ as it is currently developing. Indeed, synchronic solutions to the problem of industrialization, which the EIZ assumes, is less likely to be effective than sequential solutions.
Alexander Gerschenkron initially applied the concept of "substitute factors" to the study of so-called "latecomer" economies. 61 Rejecting the idea of a one-size-fits-all model of industrialisation, Gershenkron recognised the partiality and specificities of development. 62 Albert
Hirschman's conceptualisation of sequencing followed this line of thought. This was a rejection of the dominant idea that required "balanced growth", whereby the industrial sector is seen as an inseparable and amalgamated enterprise, 'like one huge firm or trust'. 63 Instead, Hirschman argued that development policies should foster a distortion in profits and investments in accordance with a predesigned industrial strategy, as it is these imbalances that facilitate economic growth. 64 The targeting of sectoral development, rather than attempting a broad-based approach was, according to Hirschman, particularly important in resource-poor economies (such as Ethiopia). For example, an investment project aimed at an output industry, which at first has to import its equipment and inputs, may be planned so that it promotes the production of this machinery and inputs domestically, by other companies. This then may help stimulate domestic capital formation and backward linkage through the inputs. At the same time, it is also imaginable to set up investment projects so that developments in the focussed input industries promote extant output industries, or even lead to the materialisation of new output industries i.e. forward linkages. 65 The targeted The progression of development from SOC to DPA is referred to as development via excess capacity. The second sequence i.e. from DPA to SOC is termed development via shortages.
Development through an excess of capacity of SOC is less problematic than development via deficiencies of SOC: 'development via shortages is an instance of disorderly compulsive sequence while that with excess SOC capacity is essentially permissive'.
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The concept of unbalanced growth has re-emerged in developmental economics, albeit not always overtly. Recent literature ranges from a U-shaped pattern of sectoral diversification during the development process to broader industrial policy discussions. 69 Indeed, industrial policy is now very much back on the agenda of African development. 70 In an important study, Cohen 71 There have also been attempts to make a distinction between industrial policy "in the small" (introducing mechanisms to recognise and eliminate "roadblocks" hindering existing economic undertakings) and industrial policies "in the large" (essentially strategic prioritisation on favoured industries; the linkage aspect of the unbalanced growth premise offers a standard for making policy decisions in this regard.
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At first glance, the SEZ model appears to follow the logic outlined by Gershenkron and
Hirschman, given that a spatially concentrated location of economic activity is prioritised (acting as substitute factors) over other parts of the economy (unbalanced growth). This has been the case with other SEZs. 73 Indeed, the EIZ may be seen as nominally functioning as SOC. Yet the EIZ's stated raison d'etre is its embeddedness in Ethiopia's economy and it is not supposed to be simply some enclave assembling products for the external market. Far from it, the EIZ claims to act as a catalyst for Ethiopia's wider industrialisation, which necessitates a strong connection between the economy of the EIZ and the local economy. SOC investment in a spatially constrained area with minimal backward and forward linkages will not lead to DPA outside of the zone.
Fundamental to this is that growth needs to be transmitted from one sector to another, with robust backward and forward linkages across sectors. occurring wa to the benefit of the Chinese investors, rather than the wider economy. In China, the SEZ model was implemented within a very specific political and economic context, where the state was generally able to capably "direct" development through SOC and DPA. This was absent in Ethiopia until the IPDC formation, which of course is a positive development. This is particularly so given that a study by the World Bank noted that, '[c]ountry context is likely to be critical in the outcomes of any SEZ program, so it may be implementation rather than policy and design that is the most critical factor in determining the success of an SEZ program'. The problem that I see on our side is that we are not ready to support and guide the investors so there could be some hindrances when they start investing. Now the government is paying attention and we are starting to study the legal framework on how to supervise or how to support based on international practice. But we are conscious not to make the mistake that other developing countries have made in thinking that we can just copy the exact SEZ model of other countries. 77 The IPDC's role in such a milieu is likely to be vital.
At a conference held in Ethiopia in 2011 focusing on creating the "right" enabling environment for enterprise development, a recurring theme was apparent: China's development model was right for China and whilst certain lessons can be taken from China's development experience, its policies and framework should not be simply replicated in developing countries, but rather serve as a point of reference. 78 This included China's success with SEZs. Experimental in nature, SEZ strategies were said to actively absorb foreign ideas, but adapt them appropriately to the local environment. 79 The concrete results of such thinking was the formation of the IPDC, a state institution explicitly mandated to offer up a coordinating service for investors considering investing in the designated industrial parks (which includes EIZ). Ethiopia has also drafted a new Special Economic Zones law 'based on international best practices' to guide the governance, development and operation of SEZs in the country.
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Yet despite these potentially positive moves, as well as designing and implementing SEZ programmes appropriate to the host country's economic (and political) context, SEZs must be part of a broader and more dynamic national economic development strategy that links SOC with DPA.
But this need strategizing. Simply crowding in diverse investors from China into a concentrated geographic space, with no control over the types and levels of technologies that the investors bring or the depth of linkages that can be developed to the local economy, is unlikely to be optimal. The news in October 2015 that a delegation of ten major Chinese pharmaceutical and medical supplies companies had visited the EIZ with a view to investing is indicative of this unfocused approach.
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Whilst the visitors claimed to be interested in partnering with local companies to manufacture drugs, the initiative is yet another diversification of industries being collated at the EIZ and again undermines its potential as a catalysts for development through a targeted strategy of uneven growth. Whilst all potential projects are said to be in the form of joint ventures with Ethiopian companies, tying in with the demands of the government's Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), the ability to structurally transform Ethiopia's economy remains to be seen. 82 What is interesting in this regard is that the planned industrial parks operated or owned by the state (under the rubric of the IPDC) are far more concentrated and targeted. Further research on these zones (most of which are only in the planning or design phase) will clarify whether or not Hirschman's theory of targeting sectoral development, rather than endeavouring a broad-based method (as exemplified in the EIZ) is applicable to Ethiopia.
What Chance of Success?
The potential of the Chinese EIZ to have any meaningful effect on development in Ethiopia is uncertain. Firstly, the zone itself has been considerably downsized from the originally planned area of eight square kilometres to a mere two square kilometres. Though this was due to the developers' financial problems and the inability to muster enough investors, the fact that the central government in Beijing, which has marketed SEZs in Africa as a flagship projects symbolising Chinese commitment to "win-win" outcomes and "mutual benefit" did not step in and offer assistance is perhaps a sign of its ambivalence towards the initiative beyond the rhetoric. 
Conclusion
The most important implication of this study is that policymakers must understand and engage The fact that the Eastern Zone is operated by a wholly owned Chinese venture and that no Ethiopian businesses are investing in the zone means instead that significant levels of technology and knowledge transfer are highly unlikely to take place. 88 Nor are backward linkages, as
Hirschman identifies so clearly, likely to be of any significance. While the EIZ developers claim that they are very willing to work with local companies in Ethiopia and that they actively encourage Ethiopians to invest in the zone, in practical terms, capital investment required to obtain a stake in the zone prevents this from happening. This then has led some Ethiopians to believe that rather Ethiopia increase, particularly in the management and understanding of the zone operations, then the more dynamic benefits for Ethiopians will accrue as they begin to take charge of the management of zone operations and become responsible for its continued growth and development. 96 But this ambition remains vague and in any case is unlikely to generate substantial employment opportunities with a high skills transfer content. The bulk of the workforce in the EIZ will remain low-skilled, low-paid.
The government in Addis Ababa is strongly focussed on attracting FDI. 97 Such policies are, in the absence of lucrative and easily exploitable resources, reliant on an investment climate where investors feel secure. 98 Given that infrastructure (or lack thereof) is one of Ethiopia's main barriers to attracting significant foreign investment, the SEZ may provide one way to address this issue, albeit necessarily confined to a small locale. However-and this goes to the heart of the viability of the SEZ in Ethiopia-even having world-class infrastructure (SOC) within the gates of a SEZ loses any advantages if the infrastructure outside the zone is poor (as it generally is in Ethiopia) and linkages to the local economy are minimal. This is why the government's huge investment in Ethiopia's infrastructure is so important.
Currently the Eastern Industrial Zone is in the early stages of development and it could be argued that evaluations such as ours are premature. On the positive side, it could be suggested that for the Ethiopian government a number of short term objectives have already been achieved, most notably attracting foreign (even if mainly only Chinese) investment and the institutional development of an improved investment climate. The establishment of the IPDC, which has clearly been influenced by the Chinese SEZ experience as well as ambitions to construct a developmental state in Ethiopia can alos be seen to be positive. It was certainly a coup on the part of Ethiopia to be chosen by Beijing to host one of the Chinese SEZs in Africa. 95 Within the initial feasibility studies, Qiyuan did express an interest in building clinics and schools for local community but so far they have not started to do this. Moreover, they are not obliged to do so. 96 Interview with Alemayehu Geda, Addis Ababa University, January 2011. 97 Future analyses will necessarily take place within the context whereby the new SEZs and industrial parks will 'face the challenge that many similar attempts to construct special zones in African countries have failed'. 99 As an integral aspect of China's formal Africa policies, the SEZs will be central to any evaluation of the claimed "win-win" relationship that is so prominent in official Chinese discourse vis-à-vis its ties with the continent. 100 Equally, they will be no doubt 
